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AFTER GENEVA—WHAT?

THE EDITORS

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

KONNI ZILLIACUS

RISE AND FALL OF PERONISM

ELENA DE LA SOUCHERE

VOL. 7

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New Light on the Rosenberg Case

MALCOLM SHARP

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEEZY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Unfortunately, Harvey O'Connor, whose new book *The Empire of Oil* has just been published by Monthly Review Press, has lost the first round of his fight to uphold the First Amendment. The very same judge who sustained Barrows Dunham's right to remain silent on Fifth Amendment grounds, has now ruled that a Congressional Committee can ignore the First Amendment rights of a witness, provided the questions it asks are in some way pertinent to an authorized inquiry. What this amounts to is saying that Congress has a right to violate freedom of speech in *preparing* legislation in spite of the First Amendment's blanket prohibition against *passing* legislation which would abridge freedom of speech. Inscrutable are the workings of the judicial mind. Judge McGarraghy imposed on O'Connor a fine of \$500 and a suspended sentence of one year in jail. The case is, of course, being appealed. Let us hope that the higher courts show a little more respect for the plain language and intent of the Constitution they have sworn to support.

The Sweezy case has now been definitely scheduled for argument in the New Hampshire Supreme Court on January 3rd. Briefs have been filed not only by Sweezy's lawyer, William L. Phinney, a former New Hampshire Attorney General, but also (as friends of the court) by Joseph Millimet who

(continued on inside back cover)

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

Running true to form, the makers of American public opinion, official and unofficial alike, are blaming the present acute crisis in the Middle East on the Soviet Union. A sudden shift in Soviet policy is supposed to have been responsible for the sale of arms by Czechoslovakia to Egypt, which has in turn, quite obviously, greatly increased the tension between the Arab countries and Israel. This maneuver is variously described as brilliant, wicked, cynical—or as combining all these qualities. What no one seems to question is that it stems basically from a Soviet initiative.

And yet a few minutes reflection should serve to cast grave doubts on this view.

For years, the pundits have been telling us—quite rightly—that the Soviet Union has been trying to gain a foothold and expand its influence in the Middle East. According to James Reston, writing in the *New York Times* of November 4th, at the first post-European War session of the Big Four, "Stalin represented the Soviet Union and his first announcement was that the Soviet Union 'would like some territory of the defeated states.'" Molotov made the request more specific at the Paris peace treaty negotiations in 1946 when he asked that Russia be given a UN trusteeship over parts of the former Italian empire in North Africa. The Western powers of course refused, but there is no evidence that the USSR abandoned its hopes to play a greater role in that part of the world.

There are those who now are, or profess to be, shocked that the Soviet Union should be willing to pursue its ends by the time-honored methods of "power politics," including what is probably the most potent of all, the sale of arms to smaller and weaker states. In many cases, this is an obvious pose, but there are others, mostly on the Left and among sympathizers with the cause of Israel, who really did not believe that the Soviet Union, a socialist country, could employ such methods. After all that has happened in the last two decades, beginning with the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the Finnish War, it is extremely difficult to explain the persistence of such illusions. The world of sovereign nation states is a jungle in which everyone goes around armed to the teeth and develops habits appropriate to survival in the jungle. This is as true of socialist states as it is of capitalist states. One can be against the system of sovereign nation states, as every genuine socialist must be, but one should have no illusions about how the system operates, and *must* operate, as long as it remains in

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existence. There is as little reason for surprise or shock that the Czechs now sell arms to the Egyptians as there was when they sold arms to Israel in 1948—when that country was in desperate straits.

The truth seems to be that, apart from superficialities, there has been no change at all in Soviet policy in the Middle East. Ever since World War II—there is no need for present purposes to go back farther—the Russians have been anxious to expand their influence in that area, and there has never been any mystery about their readiness to use the sale of arms as a method of accomplishing their aims.

What is it, then, that has changed in the last few months?

The answer, which ought to be obvious to anyone who stops to think about it, is that *it is the Egyptians' attitude toward buying arms from the Soviet Union that has changed.*

With the temporary exception of Israel during the war of 1948, all the Middle Eastern states have remained strictly within the orbit of the three big Western imperialist powers. And the Western imperialist powers, in turn, have taken for granted that they enjoy the unchallengeable right to provide all these countries with arms and in the final analysis to settle any disputes among them. Not only was the Middle East forbidden territory to the USSR, but ultimately it was to be organized as an integral part of the anti-Soviet coalition. All of these relations and assumptions found the clearest kind of expression in the "Declaration by the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States Regarding Security in the Near East, Released to the Press, May 25, 1950." This is the well-known tripartite Declaration of 1950 which has been often cited in the press recently but which has not been much quoted, perhaps because its language sounds somewhat anomalous in the atmosphere of 1955. Here are the three points of the Declaration:

1. The three Governments recognize that the Arab states and Israel all need to maintain a certain level of armed forces for the purposes of assuring their internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in defense of the area as a whole. All applications for arms or war material for these countries will be considered in the light of these principles. . . .

2. The three Governments declare that assurances have been received from all the states in question, to which they permit arms to be supplied from their countries, that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state. Similar assurances will be requested from any other state in the area to which they permit arms to be supplied in the future.

3. The three Governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the estab-

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lishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three Governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.*

This is a rather remarkable way to lay down the law about a region supposedly inhabited by sovereign, independent nations. But at any rate it was clear enough: The Big Three would run the affairs of that region, period. Naturally, the Middle Eastern countries which had had the richest experience of Western imperialist rule, chief among them Egypt, did not particularly like it, as they showed the next year by refusing to join the abortive Middle East Command which was supposed to integrate the region militarily with the NATO anti-Soviet bloc. Nor, equally naturally, could the USSR, which had never been consulted and knew that attempts were being made to organize the Middle East against it, feel in any way bound by high-handed pronouncements of this kind.

The failure of the Middle East Command project should have been a warning to the imperialist powers that their hold on the region was in reality more shaky than they supposed. But they either ignored it or it passed them by, for they immediately proceeded with the so-called "northern tier" system of alliances involving Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey. The purpose here was twofold: to isolate and bring pressure to bear on Egypt, and to provide military bases on the southern periphery of the Soviet Union. It would be hard to imagine a more inept maneuver, or one more certain to produce effects opposite to those intended. The "northern tier" states are ruled by the most corrupt and abject of the imperialist client governments. To attempt to mobilize them against anyone or anything was to invite fiasco. A less crafty and more intelligent Mr. Dulles would have shared the feelings of the Duke of Wellington when he once remarked, after reviewing his troops: "I don't know what effect they have on the enemy, but by God they frighten me."

The Egyptian riposte did not come at once. First, the British had to be pushed out of Suez, and the support of the major anti-colonial and neutralist powers had to be assured. The British withdrawal from Suez was, ironically or appropriately, depending on your point of view, one of the parting gestures of that great statesman who did not become His Majesty's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. And the cementing of relations between

* *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, Vol. XII, pp. 658-659.

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Egypt and its natural allies in Africa and Asia took place at, and as a direct result of, the Bandung Conference of last spring—a Conference which, in addition, gave an enormous impetus to the determination of the backward and oppressed peoples of the earth to become at long last the masters of their own fate.

This was the background to, and the adequate explanation of, the negotiations which opened in June between the Egyptians and Czechs and which resulted in substantial sales of arms by the latter to the former in September. The deal was consummated not because of Soviet-Czech willingness to sell—that has undoubtedly existed for a long time—but because the Egyptians finally felt *politically* strong enough to declare before the world their independence of imperialist tutelage.

This is not to argue, of course, that the advantages to the USSR and its allies are small. On the contrary, the deal gives them a chance to act as the champion of the interests of the anti-colonial peoples; it is the most effective way of exploding the whole northern tier alliance scheme; and it marks their breaking through the *cordon sanitaire* which the Western Big Three have hitherto succeeded in maintaining around the Middle East. Very important gains, indeed. But they are not attributable to the cleverness or aggressiveness or wickedness or anything else about Soviet diplomacy; they are attributable to the corrosion and disintegration of the whole structure of imperialist rule over the underdeveloped regions of the earth.

These momentous events present different problems—and evoke different reactions—in various countries, classes, and groups. It is much too early for a full analysis of all these problems and reactions, even if we were capable of making it (which we are not). But some things seem clear enough to permit of at least preliminary formulation. In what follows we shall comment briefly on the implications of the Middle East crisis for (1) the Israelis, (2) the Western imperialists, and (3) progressives throughout the world.

(1) *The Israelis*. There is no point in trying to conceal or minimize the gravity of the situation in which Israel now finds itself. The hostility of the Arab countries is deep, and their rulers will exploit it to the full in order to keep themselves in power and to divert attention from the burning need for thoroughgoing social reconstruction. The acquisition of more and heavier arms by Egypt unquestionably constitutes a serious menace to Israel's national security. Israelis feel threatened and cornered, and their first reaction tends to be to put the blame on the Soviet Union for permitting the sale of arms to the Egyptians. As a corollary, they tend to seek the protection of the Western powers, chiefly the United States, and thus to get themselves ever more deeply committed to the imperialist camp.

This is all quite natural under the given conditions, but sober reflection will show that it is not a promising way to advance the real interests of Israel. Israel is a very small country occupying a strategic position in a region which is, and certainly will continue to be, one of the crucial battlegrounds (in the figurative, if not in the literal, sense) between the two world systems of capitalism and socialism. Just now, these systems are polarized around two giant nation states which—moralists and apologists on both sides to the contrary notwithstanding—make full use of all the immoral methods which have come to be associated with the term "power politics." Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States is going to shape its policy with a view to furthering the interests or security of Israel; on the contrary, they are both bound to aim for the allegiance of the Middle East as a whole and to regard Israel as potentially expendable in this titanic struggle.

Under the circumstances, for Israel to court or accept a position as satellite (and inevitably exposed outpost) of either power is to invite disaster. And it follows from this that to the extent that the Israelis are committed to the United States side, it is to their interest to extricate themselves from this commitment as expeditiously as possible. The whole problem is enormously complicated by Israel's financial dependence on wealthy individuals in the United States, and it would be ridiculous to claim that a quick or easy solution can be found. But in the long run it must be found if Israel is to survive at all. The country's only real hope for the future lies in a general relaxation of international tensions and the conclusion of an East-West agreement settling outstanding issues and guaranteeing the peace and security of the Middle East as of other regions of the world. It goes without saying that this implies the recognition by everyone concerned of the Soviet Union's right to participate in the affairs of the area on equal terms with the Western powers.

Sooner or later, the Israelis and their backers abroad are going to have to face this fact, and it is wholly to their interest to do so frankly and now. As the Yugoslavs, Indians, Burmese, and others in many countries are discovering, you are treated with more respect by both sides in the present power struggle if you stand up for your own interests and refuse to become anyone's tool or satellite. By following in the footsteps of those who have already taken this road, the Israelis can avoid isolation and can acquire valuable support for their perfectly legitimate demand for a peace treaty with the Arab states—a demand which, in substance, involves the acknowledgment by Israel's neighbors of the right of the nation to exist. In the meantime, it goes without saying that in order to secure the arms necessary for self-defense, the Israelis should stop begging in Washington on bended knee and should buy arms where they can be had on a

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straight commercial basis with no questions asked and no strings attached. The Soviet bloc sells on that basis because it is in its interest to do so. Egypt has taken advantage of the fact to Israel's detriment. Israel should do likewise to redress the balance.

Once again: there is no easy way out for Israel. The country is in a bad spot and is pretty sure to have tough sledding for a long time to come. But the Israeli people have been through a lot already, and we have no doubt that they will have the strength and wisdom to find a solution to their present difficulties, just as they have in the past. As they move ahead to cope with their problems, they can do no better than to recall the example of one of the greatest of their prophets, Isaiah, who, in the words of the *Columbia Encyclopedia*, "opposed the continuous efforts of Egypt to make the nations of Palestine her cat's-paw in fighting off Assyria." It is in the Book of Isaiah (XXXVI, 6) that we read the dire warning: "Lo, thou trustest in the staff of this broken reed, on Egypt; whereon if a man lean, it will go into his hand, and pierce it: so is Pharaoh king of Egypt to all that trust him." With suitable substitutions, the warning is as applicable today as it was nearly three millenia ago.

(2) *The Western imperialists.* The Czech-Egyptian arms deal has given the imperialists a nasty shock. They certainly knew that Egypt is a hotbed of anti-colonialism, and they can hardly have been ignorant of the fact that the northern tier alliance was a direct challenge to Egyptian pretensions to leadership in the Arab world and in the Middle East generally. But they apparently counted on the fear of Communism in Egyptian ruling circles—which is undoubtedly genuine and well-founded—to keep the country on the imperialist reservation. When Colonel Nasser informed them as long ago as last June that he was negotiating with the Czechs, they thought he was engaged in an unseemly piece of blackmail. When it turned out that he was serious, they were furious—and also plenty scared.

The first reactions in Western ruling circles reminded one of Groucho Marx's disgruntlement when an interloper made a pass at his millionairess: "Making love to Mrs. X is my racket. I saw her first." But this purely negative mood of anger and frustration seems to have largely passed, at least among those functionaries of the ruling class whose job it is to try to use their heads. Their tendency now is to concede that the Soviet Union is bound to have an interest in the Middle East and to concentrate on what to do next. As C. L. Sulzberger recently put it,

these disparate movements [in North Africa and the Middle East] are of interest to the Soviet Union. We cannot complain of this. The USSR is one of the world's two superpowers. Like the United States, it moves to improve its position by making friends and influencing people. There is little sense in carping

at methods employed. . . . The question is how to prevent an uneasy area, deeply injected with fanaticism and xenophobia, from turning wholeheartedly against the West. (*New York Times*, November 12.)

This comes close to an explicit recognition that the real center of the trouble, from the imperialist point of view, is in the colonial and underdeveloped countries, not in the Soviet Union. And a natural corollary of this recognition is a reaction against the whole policy of "containment" by military pacts and alliances which Messrs. Acheson and Dulles have been so busily elaborating in recent years. In the words of Walter Lippmann, "We have now seen that the Soviet Union is not contained by such pacts. . . . The pacts do little good."* (*New York Herald Tribune*, November 3.)

But if past policies have ended in dismal failure, what are the imperialists to put in their place? Nothing even approaching agreement has been reached on this question as yet, but we can already see that answers are being sought along three lines.

First, there are those—so far apparently more numerous and influential in Britain than in the United States—who favor giving Colonel Nasser the Mossadegh-Arbenz treatment. An Egyptian Zuhdi-Castillo would bring his country back into the imperialist fold, and everyone would live happily ever after. Something along this line may, of course, be attempted by the Dulles brothers and their British counterparts, but it is very doubtful if it would have much chance of success. The popular support enjoyed by Mossadegh and Arbenz was not enough to keep them from being separated from and eventually overthrown by their respective armies. The situation in Egypt is very different. Nasser's rule has been based on the army from the outset, and the Czech arms deal has naturally strengthened his position with his own officer corps. Moreover, Nasser's defiance of the imperialists has undoubtedly been popular, and his regime has made at least preliminary moves in the field of social reform. All in all, Nasser would seem to be firmly in the saddle for some time to come. Under the circumstances, any attempt to unseat him would be likely to boomerang on its authors. For this reason—and not, of course, from any "carping at methods employed"—the Dulles brothers may refrain from trying.

Second, there are those who advocate an effort to wean Egypt from its present "dangerous" policies and to hold onto the remainder

* The original theory of these pacts, of course, had nothing to do with containment. It was the theory of forcing the USSR to submit to United States dictation by building up an anti-socialist coalition with overwhelming military power. This theory was killed by the Soviet A- and H-bombs and for all practical purposes was buried by President Eisenhower at Geneva last summer.

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of the Middle East by a "real Point Four program." The ideology of Point Four, of course, holds that the purpose is or ought to be the all-around economic development of the backward areas. In actual practice, however, such never has been, and we are safe in assuming never will be, the aim of any program sponsored by the imperialist powers. In the modern world, cumulative economic development (as distinct from minor and for the most part transient meliorations) can result only from a major industrialization drive, and even the ideologues of Point Four don't want that for the backward countries. Stripped of verbiage, therefore, the cry for "a real Point Four program" comes down to a demand that the United States spend a lot more money than it has been spending for the purpose of bribing and buying the existing regimes in the backward countries. It would be foolish to deny that this might work—but only for a while, that is to say, only until the peoples of the backward countries become so thoroughly disillusioned and the conditions so bad that the Nassers would find it as impossible to rule as the Farouks before them. In the meanwhile, the question whether the experiment will be tried or not probably depends on whether the United States Congress is scared enough—or can be scared enough—to appropriate the necessary money. If this commodity is forthcoming in sufficient volume, we can be pretty sure that Colonel Nasser and his ilk will be only too glad to give up their experiment in independence. (There is no place to pursue this subject further in the present context, but it should be noted that the amount of money required to implement this line of policy would be large at the outset and continuously growing in the future. If Egypt can get billions by making a simple arms deal with the Reds, then so can every other country in a comparable position. The long-run implications of this are, of course, enormous and may well be one of the decisive factors in determining whether the American ruling class will want to embark on this course in the first place.)

Third, there are those—very few as yet—who are beginning to think in terms of genuine, *bona fide* negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to reaching a global settlement of outstanding differences. Walter Lippmann falls into this category, though he is as yet very far from ready to commit himself to the policy of negotiation. In a recent column (*Herald Tribune*, November 8), he outlined two possible courses for the United States to follow in the Middle East. The first is in substance the course we have sketched, which amounts to trying to bribe and buy regimes like those of Colonel Nasser: Lippmann calls this "accepting the Soviet challenge." He then goes on as follows:

The alternative to accepting the challenge is to recognize the Soviet Union as a great power in that part of the world,

and to negotiate something in the way of a political truce. The objection to negotiation is that it will at once raise the political prestige and bargaining power of the Soviet Union to unprecedented heights, and thus make exorbitantly high the price of an agreement.

There is no point in speculating on the possible terms of such a settlement at this stage of the game. We will content ourselves with the observation that as other policies fail (as they have been failing ever since World War II), the pressures pushing the United States toward negotiation will inevitably grow stronger. But what Mr. Lippmann now considers an "exorbitantly high price" will look dirt cheap a few years from now if the United States bargaining position goes on deteriorating at the rate of the recent past.

(3) *Progressives of the world.* There is a tendency on the part of some people on the Left to censure the Soviet Union severely for pursuing a policy which heightens tension between Egypt and Israel and thereby increases the danger of a war in the Middle East that might spread to other areas (see, for example, *I. F. Stone's Weekly* of October 31st). There is undoubtedly some justification for this position. And yet the Russians can quite properly argue that if the Western powers really mean what they said in the tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, the risk of war is not nearly so great as it seems. In that declaration, the United States, Britain, and France stated flatly that they would not permit a war between Israel and the Arab countries (see the text quoted above), and no one can doubt that they have the physical capacity to carry out this policy. The Soviet leaders very likely agree with Walter Lippmann that "Britain and the United States, and indeed the great majority of the United Nations, simply could not stand by and let Egypt and its allies, armed by the Soviet Union, crush Israel." (*Herald Tribune*, November 3.) And they may feel equally certain that the same powers could not afford to allow Israel to wage a preventive war against Egypt before Czech arms can enter into the balance of power between the two countries. In other words, by one of those strange ironies of which history seems to be so fond, the Soviet Union is virtually guaranteed the right to sell arms to the Arabs with impunity by the very powers against which the policy itself is ultimately directed!

What this means is that so long as the Russians are rigidly excluded from any voice in the affairs of the Middle East, they can do whatever they want in that region without shouldering any of the responsibility for the consequences. In terms of diplomacy and power politics, this is a wonderful position to be in, and it makes little sense to expect any country to renounce it voluntarily, or to refrain from exploiting it in its own interests.

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But there is another question which progressives must ask and try to answer before they make up their minds about this new turn of events in the Middle East. What are likely to be the effects on the poverty-stricken and exploited masses of the region? Diplomacy and power politics have never brought them anything but misery in the past; is there any chance that it will be different this time?

Fortunately, there is a very good chance. The Soviet bloc is now selling arms to Egypt, from which no good in terms of human welfare can possibly come. But the Russians have made it clear that from their point of view arms are only an opening gambit. They have already offered to help the Egyptians construct the vitally important high dam on the Nile at Aswan, and there is no doubt that in due course they will follow this up with further offers of industrial products, technical assistance, training opportunities for Arab scientists and engineers, and so on. And in exchange they will take not crippling military pacts and unequal economic treaties, such as the imperialist powers demand for their "assistance," but cotton and rice which are for Egypt the unusable commodity form of her economic surplus.

We shall be told—and so will the Egyptians!—that the Soviet bloc hasn't much to spare, that only the United States can provide economic aid on a really large scale. This is undoubtedly true. But what counts, particularly at the outset of a program of economic development, is not the *quantity* of outside assistance but its form and the terms on which it is made available. And it is here that the Soviet Union is in a position to provide the backward countries with what they need, while the imperialist countries are forced by the vested interests of their own ruling classes to confine their offers of assistance to what will intensify and perpetuate the subjugation and backwardness of the recipients.

It would, of course, be better if the Soviet bloc were richer. Aid from a socialist United States could transform the backward areas of the world in a relatively brief time. But this is not the choice before them today. That choice, for the first time in history, is whether to accept aid from socialist countries, however poor, or from capitalist countries, however rich. Sooner or later, some country is going to choose socialist aid, and in so doing it will not only act in the interests of its own people but also change all the conditions and presuppositions of international politics.

The Middle East crisis may portend the opening of a new epoch in the history of the human race. If so, it will be an epoch full of hope and promise for the masses in the backward countries of the world.

(November 15, 1955)

AFTER GENEVA—WHAT?

BY KONNI ZILLIACUS

It was plain all along that the four-power talks in Geneva would end in deadlock: the Western powers insisted on bringing a united Germany into the Western military alliance. The Russians would never accept that, any more than the West would agree to a united Germany entering into an alliance with the Soviet Union.

Why are the Western powers so obstinate and intransigent on this point? Not for reasons of defense. Churchill pointed out in July of last year that the Soviet bloc could put 400 divisions in the field within 30 days of the outbreak of war, whereas the West could manage only just over 100! In that situation, he said, twelve German divisions were neither here nor there. Since then, the Western powers have conceded decisive superiority to the other side in conventional arms. The whole of Western strategy rests on the assumption that the West must use nuclear weapons, whether the Russians do or not, for we should certainly be defeated in a war fought only with conventional arms.

The real reason for insisting on the inclusion of united Germany in a Western alliance and keeping Western troops in that country indefinitely is political and social, not military. Harold MacMillan cast light on this matter some years ago, in a speech in the House on March 23, 1949, when he said there was a "very serious danger" that the Russians would propose the conclusion of "a treaty with Germany involving the ending of the joint occupation by all the powers." That would be "very attractive" to American, British, and German opinion. "Yet it is a fatal snare. It is, in my view, the kiss of death," because what had happened in Czechoslovakia might then happen in Germany and "at one single blow the Communist menace, both military and propaganda, would be on the Rhine."

What Mr. MacMillan was afraid of, be it noted, was not that the Soviet forces, after evacuating East Germany, might re-invade united Germany. The danger in his eyes was that if the Allied forces too were withdrawn from West Germany, so that the German people were left to themselves, they might "go Communist" (which means socialist—even the Tories can hardly believe in the tiny German Communist Party attempting a putsch).

This view runs like an anti-Red thread through the whole of

The author is a Labor MP in Britain and one of that country's leading experts in foreign affairs.

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Western policy toward Germany ever since the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. In his memorandum to the Big Four at the Versailles Peace Conference in March 1919, Lloyd George pointed out that "a very large number of people" in Germany would welcome an army of occupation for an indefinite period, "as it would be the only hope of preserving the existing order of things."

Lord Dabernon in his memoirs (*An Ambassador of Peace*—he was British Ambassador in Berlin in the 20s) explains that the Locarno Treaties (the West European Union of 1925) were concluded because we must ally Germany with Britain and Western Europe in order to "defend Europe against Asiatic Communism"; and "a blind persistence in the policy of maintaining the war grouping of the Allies against Germany would eventually have led to Germany being forced into close alliance with Russia." "Resistance to Communistic propaganda" and "the preservation of society on existing lines," were, he pointed out, "capital objects of British policy."

In 1932 and 1933, when Hitler had just gained power, seceded from the League of Nations, and started his treaty-breaking rearmament, but was still loose in the saddle and sitting on a restive German people, the French and the Poles wanted to deal with him at once. They urged the Baldwin government to join with them in haling him before the Council of the League of Nations, which under Chapter V of the Versailles Treaty had the right to decree, by a majority vote, what coercive measures should be taken to stop Germany rearming. The Poles said they had seven divisions on the border ready to march in and occupy Berlin. The French wanted an Anglo-French boycott and blockade of Germany. They wanted to keep it up until the German people, led by the organizations and parties which had opposed him to the last, threw out the Nazi Chancellor and put in a government prepared to return to the League of Nations, stop rearming, and resume its place in the disarmament conference.

In a speech on September 22, 1933, and again in the House of Commons in November, 1934, Lloyd George voiced the alarm of Conservative and Liberal politicians at these proposals and gave the Baldwin Government's reason for rejecting them: "If the Powers succeeded in overthrowing Nazism in Germany, what would follow? Not a conservative, socialist, or liberal regime, but extreme Communism. Surely that could not be their objective."

A month later—October 23, 1933—a big businessman, Sir Arthur Balfour, Chairman and Managing Director of the Capital Steel Works, Sheffield, drew a conclusion from these views, and supported it by arguments that sound all too familiar today:

Will the Germans go to war again? I don't think there is any doubt about it, and the curious thing about it is that I am

almost persuaded that some day we shall have to let the Germans arm or we shall have to arm them. With the Russians armed to the teeth and the tremendous menace in the East, Germany, unarmed in the middle, is always going to be a plum waiting for the Russians to take, and which we should have to defend if the Germans could not defend themselves. One of the greatest menaces to peace today is the totally unarmed condition of Germany.

Those who are still alive may remember what was the result last time of acting on that belief. But the world has been kept in an uproar ever since 1945, and a wholly unnecessary and mortally dangerous cold war has been started and is being sustained by the costliest and deadliest arms race in history, largely because American believers in the "preservation of society on existing lines" and "resistance to Communistic propaganda," together with their European accomplices, took over this same policy after World War II. During and since the war, we have had armed intervention in Greece, China, Indonesia, Indo-China, Korea, Guatemala, indirect intervention through the manipulation of "humanitarian aid" to starving populations, the political use of occupation forces, and other forms of bribery, blackmail, and bullying, in many countries, notably Italy, Germany, and Japan. Only this time on a global, not a European scale, and under the leadership of American Tories and Liberals, who on the whole seem to be even clumsier, stupider, more ignorant, self-righteous, and provocative than their British and continental predecessors, counterparts, and satellites.

Then, as now, the rearming of Germany and her alignment with the Western camp was the symbol and spearhead of that disastrous and dishonest policy. Now, as then, its real and capital object was "the preservation of society on existing lines" and "resistance to Communist propaganda."

But time is not on the side of the Western stone-wallers: the terms of power are moving against them. Their side is growing weaker and the other side stronger, largely because they rest their defense on propping up everything that is rotten and oppose the swelling forces of change and progress.

In the Far East, they are hanging on to the fringes and losing ground steadily in Japan, Korea, and Indo-China. In the Middle East, Soviet counter-power-politics have at a stroke knocked to pieces the whole crazy structure of anti-Soviet alliances.

In Europe, old Adenauer is on his last legs and the German people are getting more and more tired of indefinite partition plus rearmament (since the Geneva "summit" conference last July recruiting has dropped by 80 percent!), and are more inclined to take

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their fate in their own hands by dealing directly with the Russians and swapping neutrality for unification. The forthcoming election in France may return a Center-Left combination headed by Mendès-France and will almost certainly give any French Government an imperative mandate to go ahead and make peace.

In Britain, the nakedly class character of Butler's autumn budget and the mephitic atmosphere of election swindle that hangs about it have prodded the Labor Party into a degree of militancy unknown for years. From now on, the clash of economic interests between the propertied classes and the workers will more and more dominate the domestic scene. The Margate Conference reaffirmed the socialist aims of the Labor Party and recognized the need for overhauling not only its organization but also its policy. A determined minority in the Parliamentary Labor Party is bent on hammering home the close interdependence of domestic and foreign policy and the need for attacking the Tories in the international field and formulating Labor's alternatives if we are to oppose them effectively at home and present Labor to the country as a convincing and attractive alternative to Tory rule.

In this situation, the case is strong for putting forward proposals for a compromise on the two issues on which the four-power talks foundered—the secondary issue of *how* Germany should be unified, and the primary and basic issue of the international status of a united Germany. Here are certain proposals that in addition to their intrinsic merits, if any, may indicate the line that will be taken by the Parliamentary Labor Party, or at any rate by the Left within the party.

On the issue of unification, Molotov has practically gone back on his previous agreement to free elections under international supervision and insists that the "sponsored" Government of 18 million East Germans must be treated on an equal footing with the democratically elected Government of 43 million West Germans. He also says the socialized economy of East Germany must be preserved, come what may.

The Western powers, on the other hand, back Dr. Adenauer in his claim that the East German government must be ignored, East Germany simply taken over or liberated, and its land, industries, and mines restored to their original Junker and Big Business owners. That is a program for counter-revolution and civil war rather than peaceful unification. It might easily create conditions in East Germany similar to those in the (rebel) South for 20 years after the American Civil War.

A compromise would recognize the necessity for a form of limited, provisional, *de facto* recognition of the East German regime,

so as to enlist its cooperation in working out the modalities of unification through free election. One of the temporary measures agreed on should be to leave intact the economic and social regime in East Germany until unification was an accomplished fact. After that, a freely elected all-German Parliament and government could decide what to do about the question. It must *not* be settled on reactionary lines as an incident of unification and without the German people having a chance to pronounce on the subject.

On the main issue, the West adopts an attitude so self-contradictory as to make it clear that their real motives, perhaps subconscious, are not those they are professing. MacMillan explained on the eve of his departure for Geneva that the renewed four-power talks were being held precisely because the chiefs of government had recognized last July that "in modern war—or nuclear war—there can be no victor; total war means total destruction." Therefore, "however great in theory are the ideological differences between the Communists and the free world, somehow or other we have got to learn to live together in practice." Another reason why the four-power talks were held, said Mr. MacMillan, was because the Russians had discovered that the Western powers "are not to be bullied, blackmailed, or paralyzed into submission."

New four-power talks will succeed when the United States and British governments make the same discovery about the Soviet Union. But today they tell the Russians:

We recognize we do not dare to fight each other, for fear of universal destruction. Therefore we can no longer deal with each other in terms of the balance of power and mailed fist diplomacy, that is, use the threat of war as our final argument in dealing with each other. Instead, we must enter into mutual obligations, in a European security treaty, to settle our differences by peaceful means, to refrain from force or the threat of force as a means of settlement, to withhold assistance from an aggressor, to help each other to maintain or restore peace, and to reduce and limit the armaments of Germany and her neighbors under international control, pending the conclusion of a general disarmament convention.

But before we join you in organizing the whole of Europe for peace, on the basis of discarding the assumptions of the balance of power because they have become unworkable, you must give us a free hand to go on organizing half of Europe for war against you on the basis of the assumptions we agree we must discard, and to include united Germany in this enterprise.

Obviously, this does not make sense and does not afford a possible basis for negotiation. The Russians, on the other hand, have put forward a proposal for a universal alliance that does not make sense

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either. It postulates the readiness of everyone to fight anyone. That readiness does not exist. Neither the League of Nations Covenant nor the United Nations Charter attempted to make military sanctions compulsory. Even the obligation to sever economic relations with an aggressor was sabotaged in the League of Nations and circumscribed in the Charter by the provision that the Security Council could decree sanctions only when the great powers were unanimous—and after that they would be unnecessary, five identical notes from the five powers being enough to make any other state or conceivable combination of states in the world cave in promptly!

The way out is to face the fact that the great powers, who abandoned the assumptions of the UN Charter and fell back on those of the balance of power in their mutual relations, have now been driven by fear of the H-bomb to take their stand again on their 1945 assumptions. They declared at the Tenth Anniversary celebration of the UN at San Francisco last June that the Charter was the sheet-anchor of their foreign policy and that the UN represented the world's hope of peace. Mr. Dulles even went so far as to say that the cold war would end at once if the Soviet Union would observe the obligations of the Charter. That is true, if the observation be extended to include the Western powers.

The following plan would give effect to the obligations by which the four powers have long been bound and which they have now agreed they must observe. It would constitute a compromise settlement, giving the Western powers, the Soviet Union, and the Germans the substance of what they want while avoiding the main obstacles to agreement and saving face all round. The different parts of this plan are interconnected and it would probably have to be implemented as a whole or not at all:

(1) Unification of Germany through free elections under international supervision and within her present frontiers, on the "compromise" conditions outlined above. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany recognizing the existing frontiers.

(2) Admission of united Germany and all other European enemy states to the UN (and so, automatically, to its Economic Committee for Europe).

(3) Conclusion of an all-European regional agreement with the participation of Britain, the United States, and the USSR, and based on Articles 52, 53, and 103 of the Charter. This agreement would create a standing European Committee of the Security Council which would have among its responsibilities the supervision of a scheme of limitation and control at a low level of the armaments of Germany and her neighbors. In addition, the agreement would enhance the powers of the UN Economic Committee for Europe in

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the field of trade and economic cooperation. It would pledge the signatory states to act together through the Security Council and/or its European Committee to maintain or restore peace, and not to act on their collective defense obligations under any other treaty except with the authorization of the Security Council. Finally, it would provide for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Germany and the other ex-enemy states.

This plan would make the obligations and machinery of the United Nations the dominant factor in the relations of the great powers, and merge all partial treaties and arrangements in the corresponding provisions of the Charter. It faces the fact that attempts to keep the peace by preparing to win a war if it breaks out have always failed and have ceased to have any meaning. Instead, we must take political, economic and military measures to *prevent* the outbreak of war. This plan would make the outbreak of war by surprise or inadvertence almost impossible, and give both sides an increasing stake in trade and peace. It would go a long way to banishing fear.

THE RISE AND FALL OF PERONISM

BY ELENA DE LA SOUCHERE

On June 4, 1943, a coup d'état in the familiar Latin American tradition brought to power a military junta in which a young Colonel named Juan Domingo Peron played a minor part. One of its first acts was to announce that it would reverse the policy of separation of church and state which had been followed by every Argentine government, Conservative or Radical, since 1884. And in due course General Ramirez, who succeeded General Rawson as the chief of the junta, introduced into all state schools and colleges a course of religious education. From this time on, all pupils, regardless of their religion, were obliged to undergo Catholic instruction.

Why did this military group break with a tradition which had been upheld for half a century by both the landed oligarchy and the urban middle classes? The answer must be sought in the particular conditions that preceded and gave rise to the coup d'état of June 4, 1943.

The author writes regularly for MR on Latin American subjects.

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The Rise of Peron

World War II brought about a transformation of the almost exclusively agricultural structure of Argentine society. The belligerent countries increased their demand for Argentine foodstuffs, while their preoccupation with war production prevented them from exporting to Argentina the manufactured goods which that country needed. Argentina experienced a shortage of industrial products at just the moment when her gold and foreign exchange reserves were reaching new highs. The availability of capital and the need for manufactured goods combined to bring about a rapid industrialization movement. In 1943, on the eve of the coup, there were 60,000 industrial establishments with more than a million workers, as compared to 40,000 with 577,000 workers eight years earlier. These workers, many of them fresh from the countryside, were terribly exploited and lived little better than the peons on the great landed estates who toiled from sunup to sundown for a pittance and were then herded like cattle into primitive barracks for the night. All the profits of the wartime boom thus went into the pockets of the landlords and the businessmen. But at the same time, unrest and agitation began to seize hold of the workers who constituted excellent revolutionary raw material.

In these circumstances, the government became seriously weakened by a quarrel between the Conservative President Castillo and a Parliament in which the Radicals won a majority in the 1941 elections. Officials, both elected and appointed, became demoralized by the weakness of the government and tempted by the opportunities which the boom opened up to them. An unchecked wave of corruption swept over the whole governmental apparatus.

This situation practically invited the intervention of the military caste, which was in any case accustomed to playing a leading role in the country's political life by way of the pronunciamiento. Sincerely disgusted by the futility of parliamentary debates and the corruption of the politicians, the more active elements in the army dreamed of a Spartan system in which all power would be concentrated in a powerful executive determined to purify Argentine society. The nationalism of the army was heightened by the tight control exercised over the country's railroads and public utilities by foreign (mostly British) capital. The great majority of the army officers were Catholics and were anxious for closer relations between church and state, some because they were sincere believers but many more, doubtless, because they expected the clergy to provide reliable support for their rule. Some of them, among whom Peron was one, were sympathetic to the social teachings of the church and understood that force alone would not solve the problems which were giving rise to revolutionary rumblings among the workers.

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Peron was given the job of Undersecretary of Labor, and it was in this capacity that he met the young actress Eva Duarte who had the idea of presenting a "social hour" over the radio. The program became very popular with workers, and the meeting between Peron and Eva Duarte developed into a political partnership and, later, marriage.

As Undersecretary of Labor, Peron initiated important social reforms. A wage increase of 20 percent was decreed, rents were lowered, the peons were accorded better living conditions and a minimum wage. At the same time, Peron travelled from city to city expounding in simple language the dangers of foreign control over the Argentine economy, and preaching the gospel of industrialization as the path of liberation. Already by 1944, Peron was so popular that the directors of the regime thought to strengthen their grip on the country by making him Vice President. Peron now combined in himself the functions of Vice President, Minister of War, and Secretary of Labor, and he set about establishing his control over the trade unions by any and every means available to him.

When the military leaders, who had been indifferent to these developments in the social and trade union spheres, woke up to Peron's growing power, it was already too late. In vain they removed him from office and locked him up in the fortress on the isle of Martin Garcia. The "shirtless ones," alerted by a radio appeal from Evita, marched on the Casa Rosada (the presidential palace) and strikes broke out in various parts of the country. The army had to yield, effacing itself before this new force of the organized proletariat which thus made its tumultuous entrance onto the political stage. Recalled to power, already *de facto* chief of the government, Peron was elected several months later President of the Republic. During the electoral campaign, the open opposition of United States Ambassador Spruille Braden, who was alarmed by Peron's economic nationalism, favored the crystallization of sentiment around the figure of the leader. With this, the union of the proletarian mass with the nationalistic minority became a reality, and class objectives were transformed into nationalist objectives. In this way there was effected the transmutation which constitutes the essence of fascism.

Peron gave to his new regime a clearly confessional character by pushing to extremes the policy of cooperation with the church inaugurated by General Ramirez. He had Parliament approve the decree introducing compulsory religious education into the schools, and the new Constitution which he sponsored made Catholicism into a state religion. The President and Vice President must be Catholics, and the clergy was henceforth to be paid by the state.

Solidly supported by the church on the one hand, and by the organized working class on the other, Peron could now afford to

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defy the army. For ten years, the era of pronunciamientos was over. And the stubbornly maintained opposition of the landed oligarchy was deprived of any means of action.

The Industrial Upsurge

Peron's first presidential term saw the consolidation of the regime and the organization of the forces on which it was based. Concessions to the workers increased the President's popularity and assured success in trade union elections to the Peronist candidates. The chief figure in this process of Peronizing the unions was Minister of the Interior Borlenghi, a former member of the Socialist Party, who gradually succeeded in discrediting or otherwise removing all the oppositional leaders. At the same time, the unions grew vastly in scope and numbers until Peron had the support of some five million organized workers.

In addition, the President established a Peronist political party and gathered to it the political support of women by giving them the vote and organizing their activities through the Women's Front. But the most powerful means of spreading Peronist propaganda was Evita's Foundation for Social Aid which was soon doling out millions of dollars annually from taxes, assessments on the profits of the casinos of Mar del Plata, and more or less forced private contributions. The Foundation set up a whole network of welfare institutions: old persons' homes, clinics for expectant mothers, maternity wards, new hospitals, rest homes, sumptuous crèches, housing developments, workers' canteens, retail stores selling at cheap prices, and so on.

In the economic sphere, Peron's first term was a period of considerable accomplishments, the essential object of which was to insure the economic independence of the country. The gold and reserves of foreign exchange accumulated during the war were used to pay off foreign debts and to buy back from foreigners control over the country's railroads and public utilities. Next came the development of production itself which was largely financed by the Industrial Credit Bank which had been established by Peron when he was Secretary of Labor. Many industries were founded or expanded: chemical fertilizer factories, tanneries, textile and chemical factories, food processing plants, cement works, and so on.

The development of industry created an expanded need for power. The government opened coal mines in Patagonia, without however meeting the country's needs. More success was attained in water power and oil. Domestic sources were developed to cover 70 percent of the country's oil needs.

Buenos Aires mushroomed in response to the drive to industrialization. Workers from the countryside swelled its industrial suburbs until the capital city came to contain a quarter of the country's total

population. This concentration of workers favored their organization, and made it all the more necessary for the government to satisfy their demands in order to retain their support. Wages were raised, social security benefits extended, and vacations with pay introduced. In 1947, a solemn declaration of the "rights of workers" was issued.

These policies brought an immense and genuine popularity to Peron and his wife. By 1951, on the occasion of Peron's re-election to the presidency, the regime was at its apogee. It was at approximately this time, too, that Eva Peron contracted the fatal disease, leukemia, from which she was to die several months later.

The Era of Economic Crises

But even while the Peronist regime was enjoying the peak of its popularity, the economic difficulties which were destined to undermine its position were beginning to make their effects felt.

Peron had set himself three tasks: industrialization, raising the living standards of the masses, and buying out foreign holdings in the Argentine economy.

Industrialization could have been greatly assisted by loans from abroad, but the policy of ejecting foreign economic interests had the effect of drying up the sources, chiefly in the United States. Alternatively, the financial requirements of industrialization might have been met by a levy on the rents and profits of the Argentine upper classes. But the regime never went beyond instituting a system of progressive taxes; it never touched the country's traditional socio-economic structure. Land reform, often proposed, was always postponed, leaving agriculture the preserve of immense latifundias of thousands of acres (two companies alone own land equal in area to Belgium and Switzerland combined). The latifundists continued to drain away a large share of the national income, and the industrial boom was accompanied by the appearance of a large new class of wealthy parvenus who were likewise lavish spenders.

The truth is that in these years of Peron's first term—in which industrialization was pushed to the utmost, wages and profits were high, and foreign holdings were repatriated—Argentina was attempting to live well beyond its means.

As always when a country attempts to live beyond its means, the result was inflation. More and more money was printed and put into circulation, and prices rose more rapidly than wages. Taking 1943 as 100, wages of unskilled workers had risen to 450 and of skilled workers to 390 by 1952; but in the same period the cost of living had gone up to 513. Real wages, in other words, actually declined.

To escape from this inflationary spiral, Peron's financial adviser, Miguel Miranda, conceived the plan of establishing a monopoly over

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the purchase and sale of agricultural products for export, the idea being to buy at low fixed prices and sell abroad at maximum prices with the difference being used to finance the industrialization program. The effect of this, taken together with that of other Peronist policies such as raising the wages of the agricultural peons, was disastrous for Argentine agriculture. Production of export commodities fell off sharply: the area sowed to grain fell from 21 million hectares in 1940-1941 to 16 million ten years later and, because of drought, the harvest declined even more drastically. Argentine, one of the world's great granaries, had actually arrived at the point of importing grain. The government tried to compensate by increasing its exports of meat. Young animals were slaughtered, and controls were imposed on domestic consumption. In a country where the average annual consumption of meat had been 136 kilograms (against 59 in the United States and 40 in France), one now saw the amazing spectacle of butcher shops closed one day a week by order of the police while the radio pluggd for an increased consumption of fish!

By the end of 1951 a crisis was approaching, and the government began to turn to more orthodox economic policies. Wages were frozen and the burdens on agriculture lightened. At the same time, the government began to seek more support from the Right, agreeing to consult the employers' association on all matters of economic policy. The second five year plan, which was about to go into operation, set modest industrial goals while favoring agricultural production and the return of labor to the countryside.

But these measures did not produce favorable effects by the spring of 1952. The people were still living on the meager harvest of the previous year. The drift to the Right worried the workers. Ugly rumors were abroad about a huge fortune amassed by Peron and, it was said, sent out of the country under the management of Eva's brother Juan Duarte. The crisis broke in April. The union leaders, pushed on by their rank and file, demanded wage increases. Peron responded by sacking his Minister of Labor and by blaming the deterioration of economic conditions on mismanagement and fraud. A commission of inquiry was set up; Juan Duarte committed suicide; and a series of acts of violence were officially attributed to agents in the pay of the Yankees. By these means, Peron managed to save the prestige of the regime and to turn popular anger against the North Americans and certain of their domestic political allies.

Nevertheless, the shabbiness of the methods employed as well as the continual oscillations between Left and Right, underlined the real weakness of the regime; while the economic difficulties of the spring of 1952 revealed the rigorous terms of the alternatives which lay before it.

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The measures taken just before and after the crisis produced a temporary improvement of the situation during the next two years. The slower rate of industrialization permitted a reduction in imports, and the encouragement to agriculture led to a rise in exportable surpluses. At the same time, the freezing of wages plus control over prices suppressed some of the effects of the domestic inflation.

But these were all merely palliatives. A drastic reduction in the workers' standard of living was politically impossible, and the regime was unwilling to slash state expenditures or to cut into the revenue of capital. Under the circumstances, the inflation continued at a reduced pace. And when world prices for agricultural commodities began to fall relative to the prices of the manufactured goods which Argentina still needed to import, the balance of payments was once again thrown into disequilibrium and the inflation speeded up. To meet this renewed threat, Peron felt constrained to seek United States assistance at the expense of making the kind of unpopular concessions which he himself had once so strenuously denounced.

The Disintegration of the Peronist Movement

Peron's popularity had been based on his promise to improve the people's livelihood and to free the country from foreign economic control. In the event, the apparent increase in the popular standard of living was wiped out by inflation, and the attempt to continue the program of industrialization led finally to new concessions and new debts to the North American colossus. Subjugation was the price of economic emancipation. Gradually, these contradictions provoked disaffection and turned disillusioned members of the Peronist party and fronts toward other organizations. All this was at first concealed behind the imposing facade of the regime, but it came out into the full daylight with the religious conflict of the winter of 1954-1955.

To this process of internal disintegration there must be added another. As long as the objectives of the regime—economic independence and an improved standard of living—seemed attainable, the Argentine people were willing to accept the severe constraints of the dictatorship as a necessary means of enforcing discipline. But as soon as these objectives were seen to be no longer within reach, the repression lost its justification and people began to demand the return of their liberty. As the opposition grew stronger, the regime was obliged to crack down harder. And in this way there was established a spiral of repression and resistance which tended, like the economic difficulties and the concessions to foreign capital, to wreck the Peronist coalition.

The left wing in the unions and the Peronist party gravitated toward the traditionally anti-clerical Radical Party, the only one of

the old parties which had managed to maintain a degree of standing and prestige. This had the effect not only of strengthening the Radical Party but of moving it to the Left. And this in turn was an important factor in determining the political course of the church. The old Conservative Party, renamed the Democratic Party, was the discredited instrument of the oligarchy. The Radical Party was anti-clerical and moving Left. Where would disillusioned Catholics, deserting Peronism, have to go? It was in answer to this urgent question that the church decided to undertake the formation of a new Christian Democratic grouping. Here we have the explanation of why the two tendencies born of the decline of Peronism divided on the religious question, and why the regime itself in its last phase became embroiled in a quarrel with the church with which it had formerly been so closely allied.

Preliminary conversations looking to the formation of a Christian Democratic party were held in the winter of 1954-1955. They led to no immediate result, but they did cause the greatest consternation in Peronist circles. A movement already weakened by the leftward shift of working-class and petty bourgeois elements saw a mortal threat in the constitution of a new party which would be in a position to drain off its right-wing support, including not only the classic Right but also a large part of the women's vote and of the mass of illiterate and superstitious peons. It was in these circumstances that Peron decided to attack the church. Demagogic anti-clerical propaganda (usually centered around the theme that behind the clergy lurked the threat of the oligarchy) was accompanied by a whole series of measures intended to curtail the power of the church. In addition, the regime proposed certain measures like the legalization of divorce and the removal of legal stigma from illegitimate children, which were not only anti-Catholic in spirit but also designed to win the support of the Radical rank and file away from its leaders. It was no accident that this campaign against the church reached a climax in the late spring of 1955: this was the period in which the new contract with Standard Oil of California was being concluded, and it was a matter of great concern to the government to divert popular attention from this very unpopular act.*

The Final Act and the Present Outlook

The religious conflict gave rise to demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, to provocations and acts of violence. It was in this pre-revolutionary atmosphere that the embittered enemies of the regime—the oligarchy, certain business circles, and above all the military—saw their opportunity. The military in particular had long been looking for a chance to return to the political stage from which

* For the terms of this contract, see MR, September 1955, p. 156.—Ed.

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it had been ejected in October 1945. Now, with public opinion divided and disoriented, it saw its chance. The era of the pronunciamiento returned; violence once again became the normal method of settling conflicts.

The army could have overthrown the regime on June 16th,* but the high command, the church, and the thinking elements in the oligarchy decided to try to maintain the fiction of Peronist legality in order to perpetuate the division of the Left. This tactic, however, was defeated by the younger and more active elements of both Left and Right. Believing that the elimination of Peron would facilitate the regrouping of the progressive forces around a genuinely left program, the leaders of the Radical, Socialist, and Communist parties put forward demands which were incompatible with a political truce. And on their side, the young officers and the militants of Catholic Action multiplied their attacks on the regime.

The final uprising was provoked by Peron's attempt to save his regime by establishing a popular militia. But in a country where the tradition of the pronunciamiento exists, any government which fails to take advantage of its initial vitality and strength to form a popular militia and to push the regular army into the background—as the present Bolivian government has done—ensures that it will ultimately fall a victim to a military coup. This was demonstrated by the experience of the Spanish Republic and, more recently, by that of the progressive government in Guatemala. In fact, there is a close parallelism between the fall of the Peron regime in Argentina and that of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. In both cases, the establishment of a militia was the ultimate gesture of defense of a reformist regime menaced by the army. In both cases, it came too late and served only to throw the loyal elements among the military into the arms of the insurgents and thus to hasten the downfall of the regime.

The Peronist regime was a veritable symbol of contradiction, not only for Argentina but for the whole Hispanic world. Will its removal permit—as the Left hopes—a regrouping of progressive forces for an unequivocal struggle against military dictatorship? The experience of such countries as Spain, Venezuela, and Peru is not encouraging. In these backward countries where the civic tradition is weak, the forces of the opposition have found it virtually impossible to regroup and organize themselves under the blows of a dictatorship with all the means of repression at its command.

The Argentine case is somewhat different, however. Here there is a concentration in the capital city of an important proletarian

* The insurrection of June 16th is analyzed in the article "Recent Events in Argentina," MR, September 1955.

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mass with an organization and habits of intervening in politics which were cultivated by the Peronist regime. These facts will force the military junta to act with circumspection. An additional favorable element is the extreme nationalism which pervades every aspect of Argentine life. There is no doubt that the Standard Oil contract was one of the decisive elements in the recent insurrection, and also in the relative passivity of the Left. The principle of economic independence, patiently fostered and propagandized by the Peronist movement, has been converted into a potent weapon of struggle against any military dictatorship which tries to violate it.

Argentina will not forget the Peronist experience. The country which has gone through a ten-year period of industrialization and trade union organization is less vulnerable to the assaults of the military caste than the agricultural Argentina of 1945. The experience was self-contradictory and frustrating, but it will not have been in vain.

NEW LIGHT ON THE ROSENBERG CASE

BY MALCOLM SHARP

I

Two recent books dealing with the Rosenberg case present somewhat similar, though not identical, views of this climax in the recent drama of domestic Communism.* The books are both favorable to the defense, though they take a position which the defense refused to take during the conduct of the case. Each book is warmly appreciative of and friendly to defense trial counsel, and each author appreciates that, quite apart from the merits of his position, it is one which defense counsel could not practically have adopted during the case. Each author tends also to minimize a certain inconsistency between his position and the position which defense counsel took, particularly in the course of the final motions for a new trial.

Mr. Reuben spends a large portion of his book in outlining the

Malcolm Sharp is Professor of Law at the University of Chicago and President of the National Lawyers Guild. He was associated with defense counsel in the last phase of the Rosenberg case. Professor Sharp's own full analysis of the case will be published as a book by Monthly Review Press in the near future.

* William E. Reuben, *The Atom Spy Hoax*, Action Books, New York, 1955, \$3.75; and John Wexley, *The Judgment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg*, Cameron and Kahn, New York, 1955, \$6.00.

NEW LIGHT ON THE ROSENBERG CASE

course of the leading spy cases, beginning with the publication of Gouzenko's accusations in 1946, and their relationship to the Canadian cases, and continuing through the Rosenberg-Sobell cases. It is Mr. Reuben's view that the excitement over the spy cases was deliberately exaggerated throughout and was a principal means of bringing on the cold war. His book is a valuable stimulus to observation of the relationships between the cold war and the spy scares.

Nevertheless, on its own dating it is in two respects unconvincing. In my opinion, at any rate, the cold war began at least as early as May of 1945; and it originated, as all the never-ending cold wars of history have originated, in the mutual hostilities of leading communities. Truman attacked Molotov on the Polish situation when Molotov was on his way to the first San Francisco United Nations meeting. While the Polish issue was temporarily adjusted by Hopkins and Stalin, disagreement and mistrust over eastern Europe at the London Conference in September, 1945, were the occasion for the persistence of the conflict which many had expected, on one ground or another, between the two leading powers of the world.

In the second place, it seems to me that the first spy scare in Canada and the relatively mild first domestic Communist scare in the United States can be explained without resort to a theory of deliberate provocation on the part of a ruling group. Each was much like the scare over the Milwaukee Germans that, as a one-time resident of Wisconsin, I can remember from 1917 and 1918. Though all these scares were doubtless used by those whose interests and passions were already committed to conflict, each was in its origin a spontaneous and irrational reaction to foreign affairs. At a certain point, indeed, it is difficult not to see the appearance, say in 1948, of something which looks like a provocative conspiracy of the "right." The most unreliable characters imaginable—Budenz, Chambers, Miss Bentley—were used by equally undependable characters who for a time had more public following.

While I thus disagree with Mr. Reuben's view of the part played by the spy scare in the cold war, and with his account of the origins of the spy scare, it will be seen that I share Mr. Reuben's opinion that it was in part deliberately exaggerated, and his opinion that it made some contribution to the fury of the cold war. It will also be seen that I am, as I have indicated publicly from the beginning, a skeptic about the State Department's theory of the cold war. If I could be convinced that atomic espionage was simply a "hoax," it would support my general position about the cold war; but it is not a necessary element in that position, and in any event I find I must separate the evidentiary problems about espionage from the evidentiary problems arising in connection with the Truman-Molotov conference of May, 1945, and the London Conference of September, 1945.

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II

On the evidentiary problems about the spy scare in general, Mr. Reuben deserves respectful consideration. Historians, political scientists, and students of law will need to come to his presentation with an open, as well as a critical, mind. He is committed to a position, and the need for a critical mind will be apparent at the start. His first part deals with the Canadian cases. He reminds us of the acquittals and reduces the convictions to their natural size. He is more skeptical about the confession of Allan Nunn May than is Mr. Wexley, who fully shares Mr. Reuben's and Dean Wigmore's doubts* about the dependability of confessions in general. Mr. Reuben is writing argumentatively. His bias perhaps appears most clearly in a much later chapter where, in dealing with an alleged American spy, Alfred Dean Slack, he presents the defense position, together with a citation to the report which gives a clue to a court's strongly reasoned contrary view, which, however, he does not present.

This is the defect of enthusiasm. The critical reader will need to resist at every point the tendency to say that here is an omission, or here an overargued point, and so there can be nothing to the case. If he falls into this logical error, he will miss a position which should be well considered. Mr. Reuben and Mr. Wexley between them have presented facts, together doubtless with some errors, which are unpalatable. I consider them at least as safe guides as those writers, including some of professional stature, who fell into the accepted standard patterns of the spy scare in the cold war, as historians and lawyers of stature fell into standard patterns about the war of 1914, many of which have been universally recognized as subject to discount and correction.

III

While Mr. Reuben devotes somewhat more than half his book to the Rosenberg-Sobell cases, Mr. Wexley writes throughout about these cases. The theories of the two books are similar, though they differ in some interesting respects.

Both writers insist that there is no adequate evidence that any atomic espionage whatever took place in the sequence of events which

* The late Dean Wigmore, the outstanding authority of his generation on the law of evidence, expressed his doubts as late as 1931 by means of a quotation from an English treatise, *Best on Evidence*, in the second edition of *Principles of Judicial Proof*. On the other hand, in his *Treatise on Evidence*, third edition, 1940, Dean Wigmore presents a view more favorable to the usefulness of confessions, and distinguishes the plea of guilty, which, as he observes, is and must be generally acceptable. If the curious reader will follow the references in *Best on Evidence* to English witchcraft cases, he will find—in my judgment—ample support for the points made by Mr. Wexley about the dangers in uncorroborated confessions, whatever their technical form.

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were treated at the trial as constituting the Rosenberg-Sobell cases. Both draw attention to the late Dean Wigmore's warnings about the use of uncorroborated confessions as evidence of guilt. Among other things, Dean Wigmore has reminded us that in witchcraft trials people confessed to doing things which, according to modern views, are impossible. Dean Wigmore and the authors remind us also of the extraordinary tendency of people to turn up with spurious confessions, particularly after reports of notorious crimes, and of the care which in ordinary cases policemen take in acting on such confessions. The authors of the two books remind us that we depend on confessions for our view that any atomic espionage took place. Allan Nunn May's uncorroborated confession was the basis of his conviction, although Mr. Reuben treats it more skeptically than does Mr. Wexley.

Both Mr. Reuben and Mr. Wexley raise grave doubts about the reliability of the confessions of Fuchs, Harry Gold, and the Greenglasses, which are the basis of the proceedings against the Rosenbergs. Dr. Fuchs is a first-rate physicist, a German naturalized in England, who confessed there to espionage, some of it in the United States, in the course of his work as an atomic scientist. Gold confessed to serving as Fuchs' courier in the United States. He also confessed to getting information from David Greenglass about a detonating device on which David Greenglass was working as a machinist, under scientists, at Los Alamos. David Greenglass and his wife confessed to giving this information to Gold, and implicated the Rosenbergs in arrangements for its transmission. They also confessed to giving the Rosenbergs general information about Los Alamos and a report and sketch of the Nagasaki bomb—in view of David's competence, presumably of its mechanical features. They accused the Rosenbergs of soliciting this information.

Both Dr. Fuchs and Harry Gold are men of marked emotional instability. There is virtually no reliable evidence that either was ever a Communist, or—except for some business associations of Gold—even in association with Communists. Fuchs had relatives who may have been Communists, and this circumstance, and Gold's business dealings with representatives of Amtorg, may well have given them a sense of vulnerability. David Greenglass was a person with less marked pathological traits, but he appears to have had his share of personal instabilities as well. He is said to have told people, whether or not it was true, that he had engaged in a theft of uranium (perhaps only a souvenir) while he was at Los Alamos, and there is testimony suggesting that he had engaged in other thefts there. All three were subject to fear, and the pressures which fear, combined with police investigation, may induce.

The mutual corroboration of the various stories is far from per-

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fect. So far as public reports of Fuchs' confessions go, he is not known to have admitted any acts of espionage in this country except in the Boston and New York City areas. The published reports are strikingly silent about New Mexico, which is the location of the alleged Fuchs and Gold meeting in the Gold-Greenglass story. Moreover, such corroboration as exists may be explained by the processes of suggestion, however well-intended, by the FBI, and invention by those who were trying to please the FBI as their stories developed.

There is again, as both authors point out, an implausibility in some of the episodes: for example, Gold's quite unnecessary and uncharacteristic registration at the Hilton Hotel on the occasion of his supposed visit to the Greenglasses at Los Alamos. There are some internal inconsistencies in the stories: for example, the different dates which Gold ascribes to his espionage activities. There are inconsistencies between the stories and the public statements of the FBI: for example, the stories about the conditions under which Gold's first confession was made. There are suspicious circumstances about what we know of the evolution of the stories: for example, the circumstance that Greenglass testified at the Rosenberg trial that the name of Gold was, so far as he could recall, not even mentioned at his first interview with the FBI on what became the Rosenberg-Sobell story.

Both writers, who seem to have cooperated at one stage in the development of their theories, make these various points with varying degrees of emphasis. In the case of Mr. Reuben's book, one has to guard against skepticism induced by what may seem overargument about various instances of items of the same sort, at some points in the book. At times Mr. Reuben appears to be reading conspiracy indictments and trial testimony as a lawyer might read a financial instrument or a common law pleading. Nevertheless, the force of some of his points, fairly considered, cannot be affected by the circumstance that he makes others less good. Mr. Wexley's book is much better written, both as a story and as an argument. Yet one may feel, after studying them both, that Mr. Reuben has been somewhat less carried away by his case.

These observations bring us to the defects of both cases. One weakness is brought out by a document, or series of documents, which was used by the Rosenbergs' lawyers, Mr. Bloch and his associates, as one of the grounds for their final motions for a new trial. The documents include, in particular, what purports to be a handwritten statement by David Greenglass, made some thirty hours after he was first questioned by the FBI, about his supposed espionage. This document turned up under unexplained circumstances in the hands of a French lawyer, in 1953, and its authenticity was and is recognized by Mr. John Rogge, the Greenglasses' lawyer, from whose files it is

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thought to have come. It speaks rather convincingly about David Greenglass' meeting with Gold. It has, on the other hand, only two references, each of which could easily have been quickly suggested or invented, to any supposed participation in espionage by the Rosenbergs. Particularly noteworthy is the absence of any connection between the Rosenbergs and the more dramatic features of the story which the Greenglasses and Gold were to tell at the trial. The reader will perhaps remember that no one except the Greenglasses connected the Rosenbergs with atomic espionage; and that the only other evidence of anything like espionage of any kind on their part was the very peculiar testimony of a confessed perjurer named Elitcher, principally to attempts at clearly non-atomic espionage.

David Greenglass' so-called pre-trial memorandum, partly corroborated and partly not corroborated by what purports to be a memorandum of one of the lawyers in Mr. Rogge's office made after his first interview with Greenglass, is the most serious difficulty for the view that no atomic espionage whatever occurred. This memorandum is the beginning of the story told at the trial by David Greenglass which does most to corroborate Gold's confession that he engaged in espionage, which in turn is the only corroboration that is known to exist of Fuchs' confession that he engaged in espionage. The sequence is indeed a long one, and none too conclusive.

The character of the testimony given by David Greenglass and his wife, Ruth Greenglass, seems to me to be some slight further corroboration of the participation of Gold and the Greenglasses, and so perhaps of Fuchs, in some kind of espionage. David Greenglass is less unbalanced than Gold and Fuchs, but on the other hand he appears also to be very much less intelligent. It seems doubtful whether, even after some months of association in "singing quarters" with Gold, and many conferences with the FBI, a person of David Greenglass' ability could have stuck so closely to his story, if there had not been a core of truth in it. At the same time, as Mr. Wexley clearly brings out, and as I have thought since June of 1953, the story as a whole, taken with the pre-trial statement, also shows signs of being pieced together in a way which suggests complete unreliability. In particular, so far as it implicates the Rosenbergs, there appears to be no reason whatever to trust it.

Besides the pre-trial statement and—more doubtfully—the character of the testimony, another circumstance which is some evidence at least of the Greenglasses' guilty activities, is played down by both writers. This is David Greenglass' possession at the time of his arrest, of \$4,000 with which he paid a lawyer's fee. The Greenglasses testified that he got the money from the Rosenbergs. Since the Rosenbergs apparently never got a nickel of cash for themselves, this testimony is subject to grave doubt. Mr. Wexley thinks Greenglass must have

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got the money from his black-market operations and from his family. The black-market operations are, however, not well established by the evidence, and one's first thought is that his family—which is also the family of Ethel Rosenberg—could hardly have stood by while he told such a notable lie about this particular item. David Greenglass was, however, a favorite of his mother; and it may be that the family was not alert to all aspects of the case, and was disposed to let it take its course. The appearance of the \$4,000 remains a suspicious circumstance. Those who think the Greenglasses and Gold and Fuchs were probably guilty, and the Rosenbergs innocent, explain the money by the continued interest of people who never appeared—perhaps the Russian Yakovlev who had left the country after the time of the supposed espionage and long before the arrest of any of those who appeared in the case at its trial in New York in 1951.

The Greenglass pre-trial statement is the most serious single difficulty with the theories of Mr. Reuben and Mr. Wexley. It connects Greenglass with Gold, and so it perhaps connects them both with Fuchs in a story of espionage which appears to have had some reality. Neither Mr. Reuben nor Mr. Wexley faces this difficulty squarely. Each deals with it differently. Mr. Reuben disregards the pre-trial memorandum entirely; and Mr. Wexley, while he publishes it as an appendix, uses it when it helps his argument and overlooks its inconsistency with his argument. It is unfortunate that neither author dealt with the problem it presents.

For there is a possible reconciliation between the mass of evidence which leads Mr. Reuben and Mr. Wexley to doubt the Fuchs, Gold, and Greenglass confessions, and the troublesome but slight and almost solitary opposing evidence of the pre-trial memorandum. If the student thinks not of days but of hours he will observe that those first simple statements were produced during a considerable period. The frightened and confused Greenglass was with the FBI for some twelve hours before he signed his first statement at about 2 o'clock on a Friday morning. That day he gave his lawyer, according to Mr. Fabricant's memorandum, an oral statement. This statement, in its account of his relations with Gold, apparently differed from that which he signed for the FBI, differed even more clearly from that in the pre-trial memorandum, and differed most strikingly from the testimony of both the Greenglasses at the trial. The same Friday, Greenglass was arraigned and Mr. Rogge asserted his innocence. The following day, Saturday, at least thirty hours after the end of his interrogation by the FBI, he wrote the pre-trial memorandum. What confusions or stratagems or both may have operated in those thirty hours, and in the preceding twelve hours with the FBI, we do not know. Was he simply inclined to cling to parts of the pattern of the story as it first formed in his mind? Was he trying to persuade his

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own lawyers of his reliability? Was he preparing a means of escape as an addition or alternative to the implications of others? Whatever the uncertainties, the lapse of time, once it is recognized, is sufficient to destroy much of the value of the Greenglass memorandum as a corroboration of Gold's confession. At the same time, the two slight and easily suggested or invented references in it to the Rosenbergs, about matters on which Julius Rosenberg did indeed later testify that he was questioned on Friday morning, take on new meaning. The inconsistencies between these references and the Greenglasses' testimony at the trial, can now be seen more clearly, and they cast some further doubt on the original confession, the memoranda of Friday and Saturday, and the Greenglasses' and Gold's trial testimony alike.

When all is said, however, the pre-trial memorandum does tend to corroborate Gold as to his own guilt. While I myself consider both the new Reuben-Wexley theory and the original defense theory better supported than the prosecution theory, I am still, on the whole, better satisfied with the original defense theory that there was a conspiracy to commit espionage, but that it did not include the Rosenbergs. If the burden were on the defense to prove its case, either to historians or to courts, it would perhaps be a weakness that there are two such good theories. Whatever else may be said about them, however, the strength of each defense theory adds to the difficulty of the prosecution in establishing its extraordinary story to the satisfaction of either common sense or critical judgment.*

It will be apparent that I continue to maintain a position which I came to after considerable doubt, and—as a lawyer—with some regret, in May and June of 1953. I first came to the conclusion that

* On one or two small matters, Mr. Wexley has unnecessarily given opportunities for unwarranted criticism. Dr. Urey did not deny that Greenglass was qualified to make a machinist's drawing of "the bomb," presumably of its housing; but he did deny that Greenglass was qualified to give any information about the mathematics, physics, or chemistry of the bomb, "the secret"—if there was one—of "the bomb itself." Again, Dr. Fineberg's unsatisfactory book about the case makes something of the confusion introduced by government affidavits about the markings on the console table; but inspection has disclosed that the table was marked in crayon, not in chalk as the government affidavits insinuated and as Dr. Wexley, by a slip, says. The only other point made by Dr. Fineberg about the markings is so trivial that nothing but a pending case would justify a thorough investigation of Macy's practice and the chances of departure from it in 1944. Regarding the merits of the case, Dr. Fineberg's only other observation is that Ruth Greenglass' marital privilege gave her a bargaining position which justified her lenient treatment. It is, however, doubtful whether she had any such privilege against giving her most important testimony; and even if she had one, it applied at most to protecting her husband and was not in any case proof, for example, against her own confession or Gold's testimony.

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the Rosenbergs should have a new trial, and that certainly as much time should be given to the argument of their motion as is ordinarily given in comparable motions in commercial or income tax cases. I later came to the conclusion that, although there had apparently been some espionage in the Fuchs-Gold-Greenglass circles, the Rosenbergs were probably—as they claimed—innocent. This conclusion rests partly on personal associations with people who knew the Rosenbergs and had worked on the case, and it will be hard for the historian to be sure about it on the printed records. Only if the testimony of accomplices trying to save themselves and equipped with a story of a crime is to be believed, were the Rosenbergs guilty. The question asked by Mr. Francis X. Busch, among many others, will remain: "Should the death penalty be imposed in any case where substantially all the incriminating evidence comes from confessed accomplices?"*

It may be that we have been watching the creation of myths. The theory of Mr. Reuben is far from easy to dispose of; and Mr. Wexley's variant has persuasive evidence in its favor. Perhaps one of them is true; but perhaps each is a myth. It is certain that those who sent the Rosenbergs to their death expressed a myth. It is unthinkable that anyone working with Greenglass' information alone gave the Russians the secret of "the bomb itself." If one studies the skills used by Mr. Irving Saypol and Mr. Roy Cohn in the course of prosecution, he will see at work the kind of myth-making of which the public at last got some revealing glimpses in the course of the McCarthy hearings. There is myth here, but the historian, though he may dispose of the case in a sentence, will have some difficulty in determining how much. I may be a victim of another myth, which has obvious psychological advantages and is therefore also subject to discount. This is the myth that while there was perhaps some espionage, there was also an unjust execution which was the great personal symbol of the follies of the cold war.

IV

The case of the Rosenbergs' co-defendant, Morton Sobell, which was at first subordinated to theirs, has now developed independent meaning. It rests on evidence of less credibility and force than that which convicted the Rosenbergs. It is evidence, at most, of a much less serious offense, which hardly justifies a sentence twice as severe as that given to the confessed atomic spy, Greenglass. When the sentence is compared with the absence of any proceedings against another confessed atomic spy, Ruth Greenglass, it is still more striking. When the sentence of thirty years' imprisonment is carried out at Alcatraz, designed for intractable prisoners, and remote from

* Busch, *Enemies of the State*, 1954, p. 299.

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Sobell's family and lawyers, and when it is accompanied by an effort to make Sobell "talk," the character of the proceedings casts further doubt on the responsibility of those who have been in charge of the Rosenberg-Sobell cases.

The Sobell case is the outstanding example of the serious lasting effects of the spy scare. No one claims that Sobell was shown to have had anything to do with atomic espionage. The perjured and unprosecuted Elitcher, on his own testimony another accomplice, gave the evidence on which the judge told the jury Sobell's conviction must depend. The evidence is questionable on a number of grounds, but at worst it connects Sobell with taking a "35 millimeter film can" to Julius Rosenberg. In addition, Sobell in 1950 went openly to Mexico, and there for a time used other names. Many troubled people left the country at that time, and no one has contended that his trip alone would justify his conviction. If he had Fuchs' sentence of fourteen years, Sobell would be eligible for parole to-day. If our government has recaptured its sanity, it will at least see that he has his parole. That is a test of our recovery from our recent excitements.

Both the books under discussion have first-rate examinations of the Sobell case. Whatever doubts one may have about the authors' treatments of Fuchs, Gold, and Greenglass, their books are in general accurate, careful, and persuasive in their discussion of the Rosenbergs' cases. They are equally good in their treatment of the Sobell case. If one must choose, Mr. Wexley's is the more dramatic. Together they should help us prepare at least to do what we can to right the existing wrong to Mr. Sobell, and in doing so to vindicate as far as possible our own intelligence, humanity, and courage.

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BY BARROWS DUNHAM

Part IV

Middle-class philosophy, within certain limits, is a highly competitive enterprise. Perhaps it is the only part of capitalism in which something like free enterprise prevails. You can be a pragmatist, or a positivist, or a (naive or neo- or critical or Cambridge) realist, or a (monistic or pluralistic) idealist, or an existentialist, or many

The concluding part of an essay by the author of Man Against Myth, Giant in Chains, and other notable works. The complete essay is now available in pamphlet form—single copy, 25c; 5 for \$1; 30 for \$5.

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another kind of -ist, or various combinations of these, or various successions of these. You can fall in and out of love. You can be converted, unconverted, reconverted. You can be Hegelian all your life long, like Bosanquet. You can be changeful, like Russell. As befits a product of industrial society, modern thought has many facilities.

All this, as I say, within certain limits. Those limits are medieval philosophy on the one hand and Marxist philosophy on the other. The life of Western philosophy and the lives of its philosophers are spent in trying not to go back to the thirteenth century and not to go forward to the twenty-first.

The first of these limits was set by battles long ago. Our Protestant ancestors believed that Saint John, on Patmos, had prefigured the medieval church under the title of "whore of Babylon." The ideology of such a church would consequently be voluptuous, seductive, and damnable. You might, under temptation, stretch forth your hand; but you were not to touch. You might be intercepted by terrestrial fire, leading to the inevitable later fires of hell.

In middle-class society of the twentieth century, you don't have to go to the stake or even to prison for embracing medieval ideas. Nevertheless, a philosopher or other thinker who, reared in the dominant tradition, should leave it in favor of Thomas Aquinas, would find himself *déclassé*. His colleagues, outwardly polite to him, would, behind his back, suggest that he had gone crazy. In women, I have actually heard this change ascribed to menopause. A good bourgeois, even when applauding free speech, never quite understands how you can disagree with him.

Strange as it may seem, considering the Church's power, in the republic of contemporary letters Catholic thinkers are second-class citizens. Nor do other theological minds fare much better. For modern thought swept far beyond its Protestant origins, swept beyond religion altogether. Modern thought is (the word is still rather opprobrious) secular. In its ocean, the coral reefs of old theology are lovely, massive accumulations of extinct organisms.

As the industrialist will not yield to the landowner, so the philosopher will not yield to the parson. But the industrialist does take the landowner as ally, and the philosopher may take the parson, against any movement, political or cultural, having as its goal the social ownership of land and factories. Accordingly, though mild derision and a gentle ostracism are the penalties for embracing Thomist notions, an entire lexicon of punishments awaits the new-born disciple of Marx. He will probably endure not the mere disapproval of colleagues but the punitive power of the state.

To cross either limit, therefore, is to risk various unpleasantnesses. Without being Benthamites, we can expect that people will generally

try to avoid such consequences. Thinkers are people. It follows, by a syllogism in Aristotle's favorite mood, that thinkers will generally try to avoid the unpleasantnesses by staying within the limits.

But border guards are not the only means of containing thinkers. The fact is that independence of mind is extremely difficult unless it is joined in some degree with economic independence. Thinkers, we have observed, must eat; moreover, they must feed, clothe, house their wives and children—with as much grace as possible. For all such satisfactions they must rely on various kinds of employment, most of which are under someone else's control. From this economic dependence follows an almost inevitable dependence of mind.

Scientists, educators, writers, lawyers—all that various and rather noisy class which I here denominate "thinkers"—come, nearly always, from some stratum within the bourgeoisie. They have therefore some acquaintance with stocks and bonds, but usually not enough for their needs. Consequently they must go to market and exchange something for something. And what they offer is precisely what proletarians offer, namely, their ability, their trained ability, to labor.

This ability, accordingly, they sell. The conditions of sale are the usual ones, that the thing bought be profitable to the buyer. Otherwise the buyer won't buy. And where intellectual affairs are concerned, the buyer, who is our old friend the treasurer, doesn't want us, as thinkers, to think *our* way; he wants us to think *his* way. Any independence of thought on our part seems to him like caprice on an assembly line: it interferes with production and with profits.

I suppose this is why school authorities, though lamenting the lack of good teachers, continue to dismiss the best and sweetest they have. These particular skills—the skills of wisely loving a child, of calling forth his talents, of expounding to him the true nature of the world—are not desired. What is desired is a knack of imparting minor techniques, together with a habit of asking no questions.

Now, it happens that in our tradition, liberty of knowledge and of the intellect is very highly prized; and, when treasurers buy the services of thinkers, they like the thinkers to display great personal conviction. Whence it comes to pass that thinkers who are loudest in praise of intellectual freedom are often remarkably servile in their ideas. They would not for the world use the gift they profess to admire.

But, for all that, the tradition survives and is strong. For example, the men who, from my school days, taught me literature and politics and philosophy—men they were, crowned with the glories of classical scholarship—had nothing about them thin or pale or pusillanimous. They believed, and accordingly they taught, that a man should adopt a rational, defensible view of life, that he should

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amend it as truth might seem to require, and that he should be clear and frank as to what the view itself contained. Mere pressures he was to resist, and all bribes, of course, to spurn. To such teachers and such teachings I owe the good fortune that, when my time came at last to feel the lures and pressures, I found I loved convictions best of all.

When thinkers behave as my teachers did, they are trying, in the midst of difficulties, to recover and discharge their primordial function: they are reporting the universe as accurately as they can, and they are seeking further refinements in methodology. The dynamic within this function flings them once more toward the frontiers. There they scan and sketch the future, ignoring the clamor of the border guards. And when the main body of the people, their allies, comes up, they all cross over into the future and find that it works.

The condition of thought in any epoch thus displays the response of all thinkers to the current social struggles and the effort of some thinkers to assert what is actually the case. So thought records the environment of politics, an unlovely land at best, where all happenings are successive tests of strength. Some views of it do indeed beget pessimism, and one may exclaim with MacNeice,

Good-bye now, Plato and Hegel

The shop is closing down;

They don't want any philosopher-kings in England,

There ain't no universals in this man's town.

Nevertheless, the slow and (as we may well remember) *upward* history of human development seems to show that the enlightenment provided by honest thinkers will usually prevail.

What do our contemporaries (or at least the philosophers among them) think about, thus "wandering between two worlds"? The question was put and partly answered by a distinguished American philosopher, Professor E. A. Burt, in a paper read to the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, in December, 1952. Reviewing the development (which is perhaps not quite the same thing as progress) of philosophy since 1900, he pointed out that, whereas philosophers had once speculated boldly about the universe, as a whole, they now preferred the safer latitudes of language. They began as seers, and they dwindled into grammarians.

This account is, in broad outline, correct, as anyone may see by comparing the dominance of the Hegelians at the beginning of the century with the dominance of the positivists toward the middle of it. Perhaps the University of Oxford may serve as the classic example of this transition (and I suppose that any example which Oxford would serve must necessarily be classical). For many centuries the very seat of Tory metaphysics, Oxford now sustains a philosophy

which (to use its own favorite language) undertakes to explain "what we ordinarily mean" by the vocabulary and syntax we use. Thus Oxford, which had resisted both Cromwell and the more recent Cambridge enlightenment, underwent at last its bourgeois revolution.

This change has, however, been very general throughout the West. It can be traced through the books which get the longest and most serious reviews, through the men most talked about by philosophers, through the subjects most often chosen for sessions of the various philosophical bodies. Indeed, in the life of philosophy, vogue is not frivolous or superficial, but is a true and revealing thing. It expresses at one and the same time the conscious touch of philosophers upon reality, and their feeling (some of which is unconscious) of the constraints of historical circumstances.

It is these constraints, I think, which explain the shift in interest from cosmos to language. Of all subjects, linguistics is the one over which the police are least watchful. No government, I fancy, will indict a citizen for irregularities among the parts of speech. But what we think about truth, goodness, and beauty—about the cosmos generally—has great effect upon the kinds of action we choose; and in all these things, accordingly, the police are much interested.

When the heats and the hunts are on, therefore, thinkers tend to escape into language, carrying their problems with them. Since, however, there can be no theory of language which does not at some point compare language with life, and the structure of speech with the structure of things, the old perils are never far off. The flight from the world leads back into the world; and there, as before, is the blue patrolman, pacing his beat.

But Western philosophy, as it has unfolded thus far in our century, has much more to show than a retreat into language. The truth is that free, bold speculation about the universe has never been entirely absent nor entirely submerged. Indeed, the positivist doctrines of the old Vienna Circle had scarcely swept across the West, when there arose, in the very midst of contagion, a philosophy complete and abundant in health. This was Whitehead's "Philosophy of Organism," which he set forth in *Process and Reality* (1929), and which came nearest perhaps, among the works of middle-class thinkers, to an accurate generalized account of the nature of change. Whitehead was not a man to waste time lamenting human frailty. He believed that men could control their world pretty well, and he used to remark, in his sagacious, cherubic way, that "to give up solving problems because they are difficult is treason to the human race."

This principle is, I rather think, the very test of health in a philosophy. The theories which preach paralysis—which tell us that

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we can't know or can't do—are theories we can get along without. For if they are true, they cannot be useful; and if they are useful, they cannot possibly be true.

In an Age of Analysis (for so our present time describes itself)* there is a natural tendency toward such extremes. Analysis likes to explain everything away, and one of the things she has lately explained away is ethics.

This somewhat alarming change was begun in 1903 by the very prophet of Analysis, Professor George E. Moore, with an argument which has since become classical. The heart of this argument was that the quality which we call "good" is indefinable; that is to say, there is no other word or group of words which can suggest or signify it. The quality itself gets apprehended by direct intuition only. It is the nature of intuition that each of us must do this for himself.

According to this view, then, there is no definition of the term "good" to which we can require general assent, nor any way of publicly displaying its meaning so that we can know whether we all happen to be using the term in the same sense. What had seemed a rock of principle was thus decomposed into atoms of private insight.

From here it was no long distance to the positivist doctrine that what is meant by terms like "good," "bad," "right," "wrong," and so forth, is simple personal taste: "I like it," "I don't like it," "It pleases me," "It displeases me." In Vienna of the 1920s, where this doctrine originated, the police, under clerical influence, kept close watch over discussions of religion and ethics. The positivist doctrine that ethics isn't ethical therefore amounted to an effort at convincing the police that they had nothing to watch.

The doctrine proved attractive in England and America during the cynicism of depression years. Professor A. J. Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic* (in which, among many other agreeable things, it was asserted that if one man condemns stealing and another man approves it, there is no real dispute between them) had in 1935 a *succès de scandale*. The year before, Russell, in one of his philosophical avatars, had expounded a similar doctrine in *Religion and Science*. He has, however, abandoned the theory. For how can anti-Communism survive, if all vituperative utterances reduce to a mere "I don't like it"?

Now, ethical theory is the effort at explaining the nature of values, of things worthy to be desired and done. It deals with the

* See, for example, the title of a new volume in the admirable Mentor Philosophers series: *The Age of Analysis*. "This volume," says the blurb, "emphasizes those ideas of the philosophers of the 20th century which are most important to philosophy and least familiar to the general reader—ideas in the field of logic, and of philosophical and linguistic analysis." The title and the blurb are most accurate.

precise point at which theory joins practice. To say, then, that ethics cannot be elucidated is to say that the union of theory and practice must remain obscure and even unknown. It seems like a desperate assertion, and, in making it, the Age of Analysis admits that there are some things, very precious to mankind, which its analysis will not yield.

Its analysis, of course; not analysis as such. For analysis is essential to knowledge: it reveals the parts and members of the cosmos. Sometimes, however, it is so practiced as to omit the relations among the parts, and then the observer finds that he "cannot see the wood for the trees." It is a sad result, which leaves him helpless. But he needs only a little further search until principles, which are the paths through the forest, are restored.

Meanwhile, we may agree that the Age of Analysis, for all its excesses, did in many ways improve on what it found. Thinkers (I don't refer here to hacks) speak more clearly and more carefully than they did fifty years ago. Logic has been simplified, and its principles made plain, beyond the dreams of Aristotle. The fires of Analysis, burning with remarkable quiet and calm, have consumed much that was erroneous, even if they did not light up all that was true.

Moreover, the Age has withstood great assaults from a variety of fascist doctrines. "Think with your blood" was Hitler's reply to Analysis; an iterated thieves' jargon was McCarthy's. Analysis helped to defeat the one and repulse the other. No doubt it was an ally of very powerful forces; nevertheless, I must be frank to say that I find the result surprising. For, when men believe, as the Analysts do, that parts are more real than wholes and members than organizations, how do they find the common discipline which is necessary to defeat their foes? They find it, apparently, by disconnecting their practice from their theory.

I wish it could be said that in England and America of this first half-century, Marxist philosophers had behaved with as much splendor as some of their adversaries, at any rate, have with decay. It ought to have been possible, if only because the theory of evolution and the theory of relativity were such brilliant confirmations of dialectical materialism, and because Engels himself had anticipated the view that matter and energy are one.

But this advantage, which no other philosophy possessed, was frittered away. The one original philosophic mind, Christopher Caudwell, lost his life in Spain; and his successors, instead of developing his insights, have been examining his works for signs of "idealism." I am afraid the truth is, we have shown a disposition to scold rather than instruct, and a wish to seem at all times oracular on current events. Accordingly, it turned out that our most useful actions were

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silence under inquisition and patience under abuse. History's little joke on us was that we said the most when we said the least.

Evidently we are probationers, and may speak effectively only when we have something to say. It is a kindly discipline, and a proud one—for we are men (nowadays, at any rate) without easy communication, eminent publishers, well-drilled reviewers, or merciful photographers. We have nothing but the truth to get by on; and when we have not that, we are stranded high and dry. But would any of us wish it otherwise?

I suppose we differ from most of our colleagues in respect of what we want the future to be; certainly we have been more detailed in sketching it. But we differ from no one, except from hacks and henchmen, in our wish to serve the thinker's function, to contribute our share to the description of reality, to improve (so far as we may) the modes of getting things chosen and done. This is everybody's guarantee of honor in other people's thoughts. It is the sole true objectivity, namely, a bias in favor of mankind.

But we have said in these pages, constantly if not eloquently, that philosophers must practice as well as describe the relation between theory and practice. We are not to be let off, then, with merely proclaiming an identity of interest among all true thinkers. We must recommend that the identity display itself in organizational form—preferably in those organizations which over many years have ministered, however feebly, to the needs of thinkers. Decency of wage, security of tenure, and freedom of discussion are lofty principles, but they have just that force and no more which the united energies of thinkers can give. Thinkers have yet to learn the truth which proletarians have long practiced: "We are many, they are few."

Are such things possible? I have often despaired; and yet it seems to me that, despite the thousand reasons for disunity sedulously cultivated by cowards, and after a discussion agonizing in length and complexity, some sort of *oneness* can get born. Perhaps the reactionaries themselves will unite us by trying to strip away our function. Perhaps the multitudes of men, whose allies we are, will call forth our sympathies so generally as to make our labors one.

Whatever the circumstance and form, we shall then be at our proper, common task (whether we are conservatives, liberals, or radicals) of learning how to administer salvation. I have said as much before—but then I forgot to add that Marx was a kind of Old Testament prophet, that John Knox admired the Old Testament, and that I am by birth a Presbyterian.

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Which Way to Power?

Tuesday, November 1, was a holiday in France. At the request of the French delegation, the conference of foreign ministers, meeting in Geneva, recessed for the day. This left Secretary Dulles free to enjoy a day of rest and refreshment or to seek reinforcements for his program of (1) stamping out "Communism" wherever it showed itself in the non-Communist world; (2) encircling the Communist nations with an iron ring of economic pressures and military bases; (3) weakening the Communist nations internally and externally; (4) rehabilitating and restoring Western European capitalism; (5) promoting the unification and rearmament of a Germany which will follow State Department directives; (6) integrating the North Atlantic Treaty nations under the leadership of the United States; and (7) keeping the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples in their places as vassals or dependencies of the richest and most powerful "free nations"—the United States, Britain, and France.

All seven points in this program for the peace and prosperity of the West at the expense of the balance of mankind occupied Mr. Dulles during the years when he was Republican adviser on President Truman's team of Democratic oligarchs. He has worked on them indefatigably since he took over the State Department in January, 1953.

Adjournment of the foreign ministers conference on November 1 presented Secretary Dulles with a series of choices: (1) a get-together with his staff for a survey of the United States position; (2) a huddle with the British and French representatives at Geneva; (3) informal contact with the Russians. Any one of these steps might have expedited the work of the foreign ministers meeting. Mr. Dulles did none of these things. Instead, he flew to Spain for a long interview with Chief-of-State Franco.

Spain's Franco government is not a member of the United Nations, nor is it an integral part of NATO. The Franco regime is in the doghouse as far as Western Europe is concerned, and has been there since General Franco and his associated rebel generals led their African forces into Spain in 1936 and, with the active help of Hitler, Mussolini, the Vatican, and the British Conservative Government of Neville Chamberlain, crushed the Spanish Republic in 1939.

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Until the end of the war in Europe (1945), Franco collaborated closely with Hitler and Mussolini. The Spanish leader sent military forces to the eastern front to fight side by side with the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists against the Soviet armies and their Western allies. Franco was and is aggressively anti-Communist—perhaps the most aggressively anti-Communist spokesman in any European country. It was to Franco that Secretary Dulles turned at the end of the first week of the foreign ministers Geneva conference.

Why to Spain?

Why did Secretary Dulles fly to Spain? The *New York Times* of November 2, speculated: *First*, because Spain, "which regards itself as the most anti-Communist of all countries," had received from the United States (up to June 30, 1955) only \$190 million of "defense support" and \$76 million of surplus agricultural products. Madrid feels that these paltry sums are not adequate in view of the sacrifices that Madrid has made and is making to destroy international Communism. Dulles must be desirous of knowing how many additional millions it will take to satisfy Franco. *Second*, because the Franco regime is seeking admission to the United Nations and is desirous of discussing the matter with the State Department. *Third*, because of Spain's share in the touchy North African situation. *Fourth*, because the Madrid authorities are anxious to have a firsthand size-up of the Geneva Conference to date.

The official communique issued from the Spanish Foreign Ministry at the end of the Dulles visit stated that the conversations had taken place "in an atmosphere of frankest cordiality and reciprocal understanding, in accordance with the friendship that unites both countries."

Secretary Dulles issued a statement before he left Madrid in which he wrote that his talks had helped him "to go back with a better appreciation of the relations between our countries, and how to make them closer. That will be my purpose as I return, and in leaving I express my thanks to the Spanish government and all who have taken part in this cordial reception of me, and to the many people of Spain who have been so appreciative and waved to me as I went by on the streets and are here now at the airport to say good-bye to me."

There is no other capital in Europe where people would have been so appreciative and would have waved at him on the streets and bade him "hasta la revista" at the airport. Mr. Dulles feels more at home in Madrid and Vatican City than in any other European capital because in them he finds the most cordial support for his present policies.

The Dulles reappraisal of Western Europe during the past year

has shifted United States support from Paris to Bonn. In recent weeks Dr. Adenauer has visited Moscow and established diplomatic relations with "the enemy." London has been outspoken in its opposition to the Dulles "bluster and bomb" line ever since he walked out of the 1954 Geneva Conference on the Indo-China War.

Officially, Britain is the "principal ally" of the United States. Actually, London is pulling farther and farther away from Washington.

London Disagrees with Washington

The Geneva foreign ministers conference has focussed public attention on a controversy between London and Washington concerning the best way to deal with the Soviet Union and its allies. Secretary Dulles takes the position that the Russians must withdraw from East Germany and agree to its reunion with a rearmed West Germany before there can be a settlement of the cold war. Foreign Secretary MacMillan of Great Britain holds that it would be wiser to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union now, to bring the cold war to an end, and then to press for the unification of Germany. *U.S. News & World Report* (November 4, 1955) devotes a long article to the "basic disagreement" between the United States and Britain, which they note "has been going on behind the scenes for months."

Disagreement is implicit in the positions presently occupied by the two countries. After a devastating war and a decade of economic disorder, and empire liquidation and transmutation, the British are regaining some of the world prestige which they lost between 1940 and 1947, while the Washington government is squandering the world good-will which it accumulated between 1941 and 1950.

Britain's political comeback, which is a direct challenge to the "American Century" boosters, parallels a partial economic comeback which brings the British and United States economies into tough competitive situations in many international markets. To the extent that Washington's policy has restored the British economy to its pre-1939 status, it has reestablished the bitter struggle for export markets in which Britain and the United States are two of the chief competitors.

If the Labor Party were in office, it would be possible for the State Department to call Foreign Secretary MacMillan a fellow-traveler, if not an active participant in the "international Communist conspiracy." But the London government is conservative and as staunchly anti-Communist as the Eisenhower administration.

If we were asked to suggest priorities, we would put the growing chasm of disagreement between London and Washington near the top in the list of challenges to the success of the Dulles program for the American Big Business Century.

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Follow the Leader and Tit for Tat

An Associated Press story, dated Washington, D.C., October 19, 1955, called attention to the State Department's refusal to allow seven touring Soviet newsmen to visit Detroit. The request of the Russians to include Detroit on their tour was rejected on the ground that the motor city is out of bounds for Soviet citizens.

The Soviet journalists, who reached New York on October 17th, were reminded that "the Soviet Government had banned visits by Americans to Russian industrial centers." "The action was taken under a policy announced by the United States last January 3. This closed some 27 percent of the United States land area . . . to Russian visitors. The United States enunciated the policy because an estimated 30 percent of the Soviet Union is closed to travel by American citizens." (*New York Times*, October 20, 1955.)

Washington officials are countering Soviet moves by doing what Moscow does—an old game which, in our childhood, was called "Follow the Leader." Where Moscow leads, Washington goes. This is hardly an original approach to foreign politics. It may not even be a wise approach.

Secretary Dulles never tires of describing the Soviet leaders as members of an international conspiracy to undermine truth and subvert freedom and justice. Can a righteous nation like the North American federal republic afford to follow the lead of evildoers?

Another game of our youth was "Tit for Tat." "Tit for tat, butter for fat; you kill my dog, I'll kill your cat." There was nothing meritorious or high-minded about this game of retaliation. It was a device for "getting even." The other person sets the pace; you reply in kind.

People and nations who set out to do as they are done by have turned their backs on principle. If instead of doing what is right or just or true, they adopt the conduct pattern of corrupters and destroyers, they follow this course to their own corruption and destruction. The State Department, by its own admission, is following a crooked line of tit-for-tat opportunism.

Time for an Accounting

The press and other United States public opinion makers have accepted the Dulles foreign policy leadership far too blindly. The time has come for an accounting on the seven points listed at the beginning of this World Events review.

(1) Stamping out "Communist" or progressive political trends has been successful to date in Greece, Guatemala, British Guiana, South Korea, and the Philippines, but has failed in India, North Korea, and North Vietnam. The Communist Party has been effec-

tively illegalized in the United States, but maintains its position in Great Britain and thrives in France and Italy.

(2) The Communist nations have been partially encircled by economic restrictions and military bases. But the vast areas of Europe and Asia occupied by the nations committed to the building of socialism are for all practical purposes self-sufficient. Consequently, the encirclement has proved a stimulant to the maintenance of morale rather than an effective economic or political deterrent.

(3) Instead of being weakened by the Dulles encirclement policies, the Communist nations seem to have been strengthened. United States congressmen who toured the Soviet Union during the summer of 1955 were surprised and impressed by the attitude of the people and the strength and vitality of the regime. Similar reports come from China. The internal breakdown predicted by Mr. Dulles has not materialized. The Communist nations, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia, present an effective united front to the Washington-led encirclers.

(4) Efforts to rehabilitate and restore Western European capitalism have met with some success in Britain, Belgium, and Holland. In France and Italy, the slight economic revival has been paralleled by political enfeeblement. European economy has not been integrated nor has the area been politically unified.

(5) Germany is not rearmed. It remains divided. Bonn, instead of following Washington, is trying to play the East against the West for its own advancement.

(6) NATO has survived on paper. It has developed little political strength and has failed to effectivize a European army. NATO as a whole, and its leading members, Britain and France, have resisted rather than followed Washington's leadership.

(7) The erstwhile colonial peoples of Asia are definitely on the march. Africa is in turmoil. The colonial foundations of Western European property and power seem to have been irreparably weakened. The Turkey-Pakistan bloc has failed to develop. ANZUS and SEATO exist largely on paper. The 1955 Bandung Conference, opposed and sabotaged by the State Department, provided a measure of the strong, purposive attitude of the independent nations of Asia and Africa.

The Dulles record of performance in the field of international diplomacy is not impressive. His program, especially for Western Europe, Asia, and the Communist areas, is not only unfulfilled but seems increasingly unfulfillable. Mr. Dulles was a success as an attorney for international Big Business. As an international savior of capitalist imperialism, he is a dismal failure.

Spirit of Geneva

President Eisenhower issued a routine statement on October 26, 1955, looking toward "a genuine spirit of conciliation and arbitration." He warned, however, that it still remains to be seen "whether the spirit of Geneva makes a genuine change and will actually be productive of the peaceful progress for which the whole world longs." That same week, the armed forces of the United States published an inventory which listed the capital plant, equipment, and supplies under their control as totaling \$124,000 million. The "spirit of Geneva" was an attitude taken toward foreign affairs by four chiefs of state in July, 1955, which must be weighed against contradictions, oppositions, innovations, trends. The spirit shown at Geneva is only one among the many factors that will determine the course of history.

Atomics

Leaders of four nations met at the Geneva "summit" conference in July, 1955. Spokesmen for sixty nations attended the sessions of the United Nations. Representatives of seventy-three nations took part in the United Nations conference on the peacetime uses of atomic energy, August 8-20, 1955. A more cosmopolitan gathering of distinguished scientists has seldom been held. It would have been far larger except for deliberate exclusions.

Kuznetsov, speaking for the Soviet UN delegation, reviewed the Geneva atomic conference for the Political and Security Committee on October 11th. The editors of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (5734 University Ave., Chicago 37, Illinois), in their October, 1955, issue, also summarized the sessions on atomics for peace. Here is the upshot of their findings:

(1) Experimental atomic plants are proving that a cup of atomic fuel will provide more energy than tons of coal or oil.

(2) Atomic energy will soon be available to almost anyone, almost anywhere. Eventually it may be produced from water.

(3) The steps from water power in the 17th century to steam power in the 18th to electric power in the 19th and to atomic power in the 20th century have hurtled mankind into an age of potential abundance.

(4) Older industrial centers are manacled by vested coal, oil, and power interests.

(5) Countries presently engaged in industrialization may step unhampered into the atomic age, equalling and excelling their erstwhile imperial masters.

(6) The world balance of industrial and political power was shifting rapidly before 1945. The process is being speeded by the advent of atomic energy.

(continued from inside front cover)

represented Professor G. H. Daggett in the original court proceedings in this case (see MR, August 1954), and also by the Academic Freedom Committee of the Civil Liberties Union. We don't see how any reasonable man can fail to be persuaded by the briefs but, as we indicated above, we can't pretend to forecast the reaction of the judicial mind.

The pre-publication offer of *The Empire of Oil* at a reduced price came to an end on November 28th, the date of publication. The price of the book is now \$5. But *The Empire of Oil* plus a sub to MR can still be had for \$6.00.

This is fair warning regarding *The Present as History* by Paul Sweezy. Our stock of this book is running low, and the present price of \$3.50 will be upped to \$5 on February 1st. As in the case of *The Empire of Oil*, it will continue to be obtainable for \$6 in conjunction with a sub.

Another warning: our Xmas gift offer of a book free for every new sub you send in, also ends on February 1st. Your choice of books, ranging in price from \$1 to \$4.75, includes: *Man's Worldly Goods* by Huberman, *The Truth About Unions* by Huberman, *Out of Your Pocket* by McConkey, *The World The Dollar Built* by Stein, *The Treason of the Senate* by Phillips. N.B. this offer does not apply to renewals—only to new subs.

Due to a mixup on copy, there were two errors in the back-cover ad for Scott Nearing's new book *USA Today* in last month's issue. The book is 288 pages long, not 210. And the postpaid price is \$2.25, not \$2. Order from Social Science Institute, Harborside, Maine.

The many readers who have written in asking that Darrows Dunham's articles on "Thinkers and Treasurers" be made into a pamphlet will be glad to learn that this has now been done. We have devised a new pamphlet format, and the result, we think you will agree, is very attractive. Please let us have your orders as soon as possible: prices are—single copy, 25 cents; 5 for \$1; 30 for \$5.

As noted in last month's issue, we sent galleys of "Socialism—USA and USSR: Some Questions for Discussion" to the editors of *Political Affairs* and *The American Socialist* asking them to try their hands at answering the questions. We have the *American Socialist* answers, but at the time of going to press have not as yet heard from *Political Affairs*. Under the circumstances, we decided to allow more time in the hope of being able to print the two sets of answers together. In any case, the discussion will be resumed next month.

Why do the bad people live so long and the good people die so young? That was our first reaction to the shocking news that our good friend George Marion had died suddenly of a heart attack at the age of 50. The author of *Bases and Empire* and other informative books, George succumbed just after completing the preface for a Czech edition of his excellent work *Stop the Press*. Here is a sentence from that preface which admirably sums up George's attitude toward the problems facing the world today: "The world is one, and the United States cannot live by one law while the rest of the world obeys another."

From a number of candidates for letter of the month, we have selected this: "I had thought that MR would be one of several periodicals that I would have to drop (I'm back in college now—no income, consequent financial pinch), but the Debs Memorial Issue was so outstanding that I decided to renew. The excellent series, 'Thinkers and Treasurers' by Barrows Dunham, was also a factor in my decision."

Seasons greetings to all, and our special thanks to those good friends who have joined the Associates and are sending in new subs.

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